Security

Post-quantum encryption

Messages sent today can be recorded and decrypted years from now, once a large enough quantum computer exists. Szept encrypts them so that this will not work.

The problem: “harvest now, decrypt later”

Most messengers agree on keys using elliptic-curve math (e.g. X25519). A classical computer cannot break it, but a quantum computer running Shor's algorithm can. Such a machine does not exist yet — and it doesn't have to: it is enough to record encrypted traffic now and wait. Conversations meant to stay private for years — personal, family, business — are already at risk today.

The solution: a hybrid of X25519 and ML-KEM-768

Szept combines two key-agreement mechanisms: the proven X25519 and the post-quantum ML-KEM-768 — a NIST standard (FIPS 203) designed to withstand quantum computers too. Both secrets go into the key derivation function (HKDF-SHA256) together, bound to everything the parties exchanged. To read a message you would have to break both — so the hybrid is never weaker than classical cryptography, even if a flaw were found in the new algorithm.

What exactly is protected

Content is encrypted with AES-256-GCM on your phone. The Szept server only carries ciphertext — it does not have the keys and cannot have them.

Post-quantum re-keying on every exchange

Since Android 0.9.96, in Szept Web and on iPhone from version 0.2.1, Szept re-keys conversations post-quantum. On every change of direction in a conversation both sides perform an X25519 step and a fresh ML-KEM-768 exchange at once, and the new key is derived from both results.

What it gives you. If someone stole keys from a phone, the conversation “heals” — later messages become unreadable to them again. With ML-KEM in every step this also holds against an attacker with a quantum computer and recorded traffic, after a single exchange of messages.

How it differs from Signal. Since 2025 Signal has the post-quantum SPQR ratchet in a “sparse” form: the large ML-KEM key is split into pieces sent across many messages to save bandwidth. We send the full key and ciphertext in every message (about 2.3 KB) — unnoticeable on today's connections, and protection returns sooner. Signal, on the other hand, has a formally verified protocol and years of external audits; we publish the full protocol description and say so openly.

Compatibility. Older app versions keep talking to new ones without issues; the protection switches on by itself once both sides are up to date. Once on, it cannot be silently switched off — a message without the post-quantum part is rejected.

Szept compared with the most popular messengers

Of the six messengers in the table, only Szept re-keys post-quantum on every exchange of messages and gives every voice and video call its own post-quantum key. WhatsApp and Messenger have not announced any post-quantum protection of conversation content so far, and Telegram does not encrypt end-to-end by default at all.

SzeptSignalWhatsAppMessengeriMessageTelegram
End-to-end encryption by defaultyes — chats, groups, callsyesyesyes (since 2023)yes — between Apple devices onlyno — secret 1:1 chats only, groups without E2E
Post-quantum session setupyes (ML-KEM-768)yes (PQXDH, 2023)not announcednot announcedyes (PQ3, 2024)no
Post-quantum re-keyingyes — on every exchangeyes — SPQR, key split across many messagesnot announcednot announcedyes — periodic, not with every messageno
Post-quantum key for every callyes, new for each call—not announcednot announced—no
Who is behind itindependent, Polish; no ads, no trackingnon-profit foundation; no adsMeta — an advertising companyMeta — an advertising companyAppleprivate company; ads in channels
Own server for a companyyesnonononono
Android and iPhoneyesyesyesyesApple onlyyes
Browser versionyes — Szept Web, end-to-end encrypted in the browserno — desktop app onlyyes — WhatsApp Webyes — messenger.comnoyes — Telegram Web

Swipe the table sideways → As of November 2026, based on vendors' public information. “Not announced” = the vendor has not publicly stated that it protects conversation content post-quantum. “—” = no clear public information.

Frequently asked questions

What is post-quantum encryption?

Encryption built on mathematical problems that neither a regular nor a quantum computer can solve quickly. In Szept it is ML-KEM-768 — the NIST FIPS 203 standard — combined with classical X25519.

Do quantum computers break encryption already?

No. The threat is recording encrypted traffic today and decrypting it in the future. Post-quantum encryption protects the messages you send right now.

Does post-quantum encryption slow Szept down?

Practically not. ML-KEM keys are larger (about 1 KB instead of 32 bytes), so every text message carries about 2.3 KB extra — unnoticeable on today's connections. In calls the exchange happens once, at the start, and does not slow audio or video down.

Do I need to turn anything on?

No. Post-quantum protection works automatically in all conversations, groups and calls.

Do WhatsApp and Messenger have post-quantum encryption?

Both encrypt conversations end-to-end, but as of November 2026 Meta has not announced post-quantum protection of conversation content in either. Without it, traffic recorded today can be decrypted once a large enough quantum computer exists. Szept protects every message and every call against that.

Is Telegram end-to-end encrypted?

Not by default. Regular chats and all groups in Telegram are encrypted only to the server, which can access them. End-to-end encryption exists only in manually started “secret chats” between two people, with no post-quantum protection.

Is Szept more secure than Signal?

In one measurable respect, yes: after a key leak a conversation regains post-quantum protection after a single exchange of messages, while with Signal it takes many. Signal, on the other hand, has a formally verified protocol and years of audits. Szept is a Polish alternative: no ads, post-quantum in messages, re-keying and calls, and deployable on a company's own server.